I Wanted to Be Wrong About eFishery. I Really Did.

I remember the pitch. I remember the guy. I remember sitting in the same room as him around ten years ago, listening to people praising his tenacity, seeing well regarded people and startup figures laud him as a visionary, and walking away feeling that gnawing sense I’ve come to trust over the years. When the story feels too clean, too heartwarming, too startup-perfect.

But I didn’t say anything publicly to avoid being called out for having a markedly opposing view and being highly skeptic about it, not to mention the predictable judgment that would have come, accusing me of being envious while not being anywhere near successful. It was after all a gut feeling with little to back it up and I wasn’t about to go on a mission to take down the latest tech darling of the nation, the pride and Joy of the Indonesian startup community, with no support. This company was an international sensation and people in my circle knew of my doubts but I don’t recall posting publicly about it.

When everyone else was throwing praise and cash at a fish-feeder startup like it’s the second coming of Grameen Bank, it’s easy to start wondering if maybe you’re just being cynical. Maybe you’re jaded. Maybe the founder really was a scrappy visionary from East Jakarta who’s cracked aquaculture and was about to scale empathy and catfish across Southeast Asia. I mean look at all those articles about the company and how this guy appearing out of nowhere becoming something of a tech startup prophet.

Except now, here we are: $300 million gone, farmers screwed, machines abandoned, and the poster child of “tech for good” exposed as a meticulously constructed con.

And you know what? I’m not surprised. I’m pissed.

Because I wanted to be wrong. I wanted this story to be true. I wanted this to be the one that proved that impact and innovation and bottom-of-the-pyramid hustle could build something real. But from the beginning, eFishery had all the wrong kinds of charm: the underdog myth polished to perfection, the handcrafted pitch deck trauma-bonding with VCs who wanted to save the world without leaving the hotel lounge.

He said all the right things. He did all the right gestures, looking all pious and revered. And when the numbers didn’t line up? When the tech was too expensive for the people it was supposed to help? When the revenue made zero sense for a company claiming to transform Indonesia’s rural fish farms? Everyone just nodded harder.

I watched as global investors, SoftBank, Temasek, Sequoia (Peak XV), Social Capital, lined up to outbid each other for a slice of this sweet, scalable fiction. And the media? Oh, we played along too. We love a redemption arc. We love a startup that feeds fish and our desire to feel like capitalism might still be capable of doing something decent. Again, with all these big name international funds coming in to feed the fish feeding startup, who am I to contradict their supposed intellect and superior judgment?

But deep down, I kept thinking: this doesn’t smell like fish. It smells like a fishy performance.

Now that it’s unraveled, this wasn’t just a few optimistic numbers or an overzealous forecast. This was systemic. Two sets of books. Ghost transactions. Fake shell companies. A finance operation so convoluted it’d make a crypto bro blush. All of it propped up by a moral calculus so warped it might as well have been cribbed from a freshman philosophy seminar: “Yes, I lied, but I helped some farmers, so doesn’t that count for something?”

No, it doesn’t. You don’t get to run over everyone with the trolley and call it “net positive.”

The real damage here isn’t just financial. It’s reputational. It’s trust. It’s yet another blow to the already fragile belief that startups in emerging markets can build something real without burning down the ecosystem around them. This kind of fraud doesn’t just hurt investors. It makes it harder for every honest founder grinding away on a real solution with real traction and real limitations.

And don’t get me started on due diligence. Multiple rounds of funding, multiple term sheets, global funds with armies of analysts, and no one noticed the company stopped filing basic financials in Singapore? That feeder machines were supposedly deployed at scale with zero supply chain footprint? That fish feed producers weren’t even aware of this supposed revolution happening in their own backyard?

The worst part? Some people will still excuse it. They’ll frame it as a tragedy. As a good person corrupted by pressure. A “lesson” for the ecosystem. I get it. That’s cleaner. Easier. But I can’t do that. Not after watching people celebrate this company like it was changing the world, when some of us knew it wasn’t adding up.

There were moments when I wondered if I was just being too harsh, too skeptical. I thought, maybe I’m just tired of the hype machine. Maybe I’m projecting.

Turns out I wasn’t projecting. I was just paying attention and my gut was screaming against my rationale.

And now, here’s the wreckage: laid-off staff, bankrupt farmers, investors licking wounds, and a founder who thinks starting a frozen seafood business is part of his redemption arc.

No. You don’t get to fail upward on the backs of people you lied to.

This wasn’t inevitable. This wasn’t an honest mistake. This was a choice, repeated, amplified, and dressed up as progress. And he did it because everyone he asked told him it’s okay to do it because they all did it too. They all failed him and everyone paid the price. Fake it til you make it, they said. Well, in this story, nobody made it.

And I hate that my gut feeling was right.

On the other hand he managed to hoodwink Chamath Palihapitiya who deserves everything coming at him.

The Collapse of Chinese EV Startups is a Wake-Up Call for the Industry

Rest of World published a compelling piece on the collapse of several Chinese EV startups, and there’s a glaring lesson for the entire industry: Car startups shouldn’t be developing their own software. They should rely on established software companies to build, license, and deploy that software.

Think about it: You shell out tens of thousands, maybe more, for a car—an investment you expect to last for a decade or longer. And for EVs, the software isn’t just a dashboard convenience, it’s central to the entire driving experience. From battery management to over-the-air updates and self-driving features, software makes or breaks the car.

Now, let’s imagine you buy a shiny new EV from a flashy startup. Three years later, that startup folds. What happens to your software updates? What happens to the core functionality of your vehicle if the startup disappears? Spoiler: you’re screwed. 

When an EV company collapses, it’s not just a question of no more updates or no more customer support. It’s much worse. Your vehicle could be left with outdated software that becomes incompatible with new systems, or worse, it could stop functioning altogether. This is especially true when startups decide to build their own custom software ecosystems from the ground up. It sounds like a smart idea to stand out in a crowded market, but it’s more like building a sandcastle next to the ocean—it’s not going to last, and it’s the customers who end up with sand on their shoes.

Take Byton, for example. They were around for four years, from 2017 to 2021, with big dreams of luxury electric SUVs featuring fancy tech. It was a Tencent – Foxconn joint venture, but all their resources couldn’t save them from the software pit they dug themselves into. They poured talent, effort, and money into creating a massive dashboard screen with a custom UI, promising AI-driven features. And where did it get them? Bankruptcy.

Or consider Bordrin Motors, another four-year wonder from 2016 to 2020. They developed their own vehicle operating system and digital cockpit platform. Sounds cool, right? Well, it would be if they hadn’t run out of money trying to maintain it all.

Established software companies like Apple, Google, and Microsoft have been making software for decades. They know what it takes to keep an ecosystem alive, stable, and, more importantly, secure. The idea of rolling your own software is not new—remember when every gadget maker wanted to make their own OS? It was a disaster then, and it’s a disaster now. Why should carmakers fare any better?

Instead, EV startups should focus on what they’re supposed to be good at: building great electric cars. Let the software experts handle the software. Tesla, for all its faults, is still in the game partly because of its strong software focus. They’ve managed to build a robust platform that, so far, has stood the test of time. But here’s the catch: not every startup can be Tesla, nor should they try to be. 

Some Chinese EV companies are getting it right. Look at Xpeng Motors and Li Auto. These guys are smart. They’re doing a mix of in-house development and licensing from established tech providers. Xpeng partnered with NVIDIA for AI computing and works with Desay SV Automotive for some software components. Li Auto isn’t too proud to license components for specific functionalities. And guess what? They’re still in business!

Licensing software from a more established player means that even if your car startup fails, your customers aren’t stuck with an expensive, bricked paperweight in their driveway. Their car can still receive updates, still work, and they aren’t left holding the bag. It’s akin to separating hardware from software in the tech world: Apple doesn’t build its processors, TSMC does. Apple doesn’t make its screens; Samsung does. Division of labor works for a reason.

Apple is an example of a tech company that wants to do the whole widget and they mostly do these days, but still not everything. They design their hardware but they don’t build them. The manufacturing and assembly go to partners like Foxconn and Pegatron. They didn’t design their own processors until they have the resources to put together the teams for it. And in their early days they didn’t even design their own products. Apple hired frogdesign (now just Frog) to design their computers and come up with a design language to be followed by the company’s lines of products so they all have the same style.

The problem is that too many startups have founders who think they can do it all. They want to control every aspect of the experience, which is admirable until reality sets in. Building a car is hard enough. Making great software is equally hard. Trying to do both? It’s a fool’s errand. And who pays the price for that arrogance? The consumers.

It’s one thing to purchase a phone or computer and no longer receiving updates or support after 3-4 years but when it’s a car that costs tens of thousands of dollars, you damn sure want to be able to use it for more than just a few years or at least sell it at a decent price when you need to.

No startup founder builds their company expecting to fail, so of course they will spend resources to do everything. However, when a company is just starting up the leaders need to be able to determine what their areas of strengths are, what sort of resources can they pull, and what factors can or should be outsourced to leverage outside expertise and increase internal efficiency. Once a company is strong enough to maintain a solid core and grow a business from there, then they can begin to consider building or developing non core elements internally. Of course, they also need to be able to identify what their actual core strengths are, lest they focus on the wrong things and end up accelerating their own collapse.

The key takeaway here is simple: EV startups need to know their limits. No matter how much venture capital you have or how many big names are on your board, you’re not a software company just because you hire a few software engineers. You’re a car company, so act like one. Leave the software to those who know it best. Because in the end, if you go under, it’s the customers who will feel the real crash.

From Jason Calacanis’ post

Startup Side Projects

rrhoover:

ping-phone.png

Last night, Secret launched Ping, a semi-mysterious app that lives on your lock screen. Immediately, my interest piqued and so did my skepticism. Why were they building a new app? Was Secret not working out?

I wasn’t the only one with questions. On Product Hunt, Danny Espinoza asked:

@davidbyttow so should we read anything into how things are going with Secret with this release or is this just a N-O-R-T-H-like experiment?

Startup Side Projects

Political Party or Startup?

There’s a lot of similarities in founding startup companies and political parties in Indonesia.

Both require committed founders, lots of money, solid product, and aggressive member or user acquisition. Their eventual options are either to be one of the larger parties or they sell to one of the larger parties.

In political parties, the products are the legislative candidates carrying the belief and the idea that the party will make a difference and bring positive change to the people they meant to represent. Parties send candidates or evangelists who promise to bring about such change to gain voters and get these candidates to the parliaments to supposedly do what they say.

If user or voter acquisition efforts fail to deliver on time, the co-founders along with the board may decide to sell the entity and bring its users/voters to the acquiring entity in the hope that they don’t get too pissed off. The top executives may also decide to join the flock to ease concerns that the idealism would go away once the old entity disappears. Of course, having been built with various levels of differences in ideologies, implementations, and executions, there will always be friction and the post merger/acquisition results depend on how these are handled by the new team.

Regardless of the outcome, I’ve found the entire end to end process in both cases extremely similar in its core. Similar principles apply to both situations and similar theories also work in practice to solve the issues that they face. – Read on Path.

What’s going on with Michael Arrington?

At the beginning it looked like Arrington simply wanted to go back to investing since that’s how he got into this blogging business in the first place and even more so recently when he put money into a number of startups.

The way AOL is going about the news from today however, is a lot less clear. AOL had committed Arrington for three years as part of the TechCrunch acquisition which means he’s still got about two years to go but if AOL wanted him out of TC, they could be shifting him aside to another arm outside of the Huffington media group.

Here’s a summary by Dan Primack at Fortune:

It told the NYT that Arrington would still have a (reduced) role with the site, and continue reporting directly to Arianna Huffington. Then AOL said he would report to AOL Ventures. Today it says that he is no longer employed by the company, but can continue contributing to TechCrunch as an unpaid blogger. In other words, AOL is acting like AOL typically acts: Scattershot.

It’s been less than 24 hours so the flurry of news is still coming in and even news out of AOL itself isn’t clear. Nobody seems to have a straight story to tell.

Meanwhile, not a peep from TechCrunch but a monster rant from Kara Swisher.

[update] Paul Carr has his say on the matter. Yes, AOL screwed up in announcing the CrunchFund.

What’s going on with Michael Arrington?

Why Ad Agencies Should Act More Like Tech Startups | Fast Company

The problem is that everyone is telling stories nowadays. Even if you have a good story to tell about your brand, chances are that it’ll get lost.
That’s where I believe that the very definition of the “idea” needs to evolve.

Why Ad Agencies Should Act More Like Tech Startups | Fast Company

12seconds.TV shuts down

Some time in 2008 I heard about 12seconds TV, a site where people can upload short clips of videos of themselves of up to 12 seconds. It was like the Twitter version of YouTube, everything had to be short and concise. It was a neat idea.

Apparently the site shut down today. Notice was given on October 4, so it was a pretty short one. Startups come and go, business models don’t always stick. See you around, 12seconds, I never got to check you out.

12seconds.TV shuts down